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1. Introduction
Historical estimates of the inequality of wealth in Sweden show a decline in inequality from the
beginning of this century to the middle of the 1970’s. According to the estimates in
Spånt(1987) the five per cent richest households owned 77 per cent of  total net wealth at
taxed values in 1920 but only 44 per cent in 1975. Jansson & Johansson(1988) got a somewhat
lower estimate for total net wealth at market values in 1975, 38 per cent and almost the same
figure for 1985, 37 per cent. The decline in the inequality of wealth thus came to a halt in the
mid 1970’s. An international comparison shows that the Swedish inequality in 1975 was
comparatively low. In a table put together in Kessler & Masson(1987) the five per cent richest
in most other countries included in their table held about 45 per cent of total net wealth with
the exception of United Kingdom for which the estimate was 57 per cent.
Pålsson(1993) discussed the reasons why the inequality of wealth did not continue to
decline. She suggested that this was the result of  rather dramatic changes in asset prices. From
a peak in 1979 the prices of owner occupied houses returned in 1985 to their mid 1960’s level.
Listed shares on the other hand more than doubled in price in the first half of the 1980’s. As
wealthy households held a relatively large share of stocks and shares while the owner occupied
house was the major asset for most ordinary households she concluded that these changes in
asset prices could explain why the trend in the inequality of wealth no longer decreased.
After 1985 the Swedish economy has experienced a few major policy shocks. The
financial markets became deregulated which resulted in a credit expansion and an increased
demand for credit financed real estate and consumer durables. The real estate prices continued
to increase until the beginning of the 1990’s and so did the prices of stocks and shares. The
stock market peaked a little before the real estate market. Real interest rates after tax for a
person who wanted to borrow money were negative until the beginning of the 1990’s and
increased sharply. Inflation averaged almost 7 per cent 1985-1991 with a peak close to 11 per
cent in 1990. In 1992 inflation dropped to about 2 per cent. In this year the exchange rate of
the Swedish crown was unsuccessfully defended by increased interest rates and in November
the crown was untied from the ECU and left floating. The financial crises also had a major
impact on the real economy and the Swedish unemployment rate started to increase and
reached a level never experienced before.
At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s major changes in the tax system
were likely to influence household portefolios. Cuts in the marginal tax rates and limitations in
the possibilities to deduct interest paid were introduced already in the second half of the3
1980’s, but a major tax reform was decided and implemented in 1990/91. This reform
decreased the marginal income taxes, broadened the tax basis, and included major changes in
the taxation of the returns from financial assets and real estate. In summary, the effects on the
distribution of wealth were expected to become a decrease in the shares of liabilities, real estate
and consumer durables and an increase in the share of financial assets, in particular, bank
deposits and bonds.
This paper offers an analysis of the changes in the Swedish distribution of wealth after
1980 and in particular in the years before and after the tax reform with the additional purpose
of relating the observed changes to policy and market changes. In doing this we rely on rather
unique panel data which do not only permit an extension in time of previous studies but also
for the first time a study of wealth mobility in Sweden. Below follows first a discussion of data
issues and a comparison between two different data sources, then an analysis of total wealth
and its components, the inequality of wealth, a multivariate analysis of changes in total wealth
and finally the analysis of the mobility of wealth.
2. Data
The HUS surveys
The survey ”Household Market and Nonmarket Activities” (HUS) is a panel survey of a
random sample of Swedish households. Three waves include extensive wealth data, namely the
1984, 1986 and 1993 waves. In this study we will use all three but mostly concentrate on the
last two. The sample size is rather small. The number of households included are 1505, 1772
and 1150 
1 respectively. In all three waves questions about the wealth of the household were
administered to the household head in a written questionaire. The field work was done in the
first half of the survey year and responses about assets applied to December 31 of the
preceeding year. In the sequel we will use the notation 1983/84 to denote stocks of assets as of
the end of 1983 and beginning of 1984 and analogously for other years. When personal
interviews were used the questionaire was handed over to the head who was asked to write
down his/her responses in privacy and return the questionaire to the interviewer in a cealed
envelope. When telephone interviews were used the same questionaire was mailed to the head
after the interview and the head was asked to return it by mail. By using the same instrument in
collecting wealth data we do not believe that the choice of interview mode for the main
interview (personal or telephone) much influenced the responses to the wealth questions.4
Our wealth data are thus primarily based on the respondents own evaluation and
responses. Market values of owner occupied houses, condominiums, secondary dwellings and
other properties were estimated by the respondents. The same is true for consumer durables
(except for  the 1984 wave when a slightly more elaborate scheme was used). Financial assets
are of four kinds: bank deposits; stocks, shares and bonds; private life insurance policies
2; and
private pension policies. To protect the respondent’s privacy and to avoid partial nonresponse,
bonds were not separated from stocks and shares.
3 For the same reason responses were only
asked for in relatively broad intervals. The questionnaires separated between mortgages on
owner occupied homes and other liabilities. In both cases we used the respondent’s estimates.
The main principle of the household definition is that the household should constitute an
economic unit. This means, among other things, that household members usually have the same
residence, that they have some form of shared housekeeping and spend a certain amount of
time together.  This implies, for instance that parents and adult children who live with their
parents form one joint household. The wealth concept used through out this study is the total
household wealth and not per capita wealth or wealth per equivalent adult.
A disadvantage of the HUS-survey is that it does not cover the very old households. The
sampling frame only included individuals below the age of 75. It is not evident how this will
influence measures of the inequality of wealth. Among the very old are both poor households
and households with large fortunes. One might guess that the inequality of wealth would
increase a little if these households had been included.
Nonresponse is almost always a problem with survey data and in particular when the
survey includes such sensitive issues as the respondent’s assets and liabilities, and the HUS
surveys are no exceptions. In all we have data for 2305 households which participated in at
least one survey wave. Data were missing and imputed for at least one variable and for at least
one year in 59.2 per cent of these cases, i.e. there are complete data for only 40.8 per cent of
all households. The share of imputations varied from 3.2 per cent for Secondary dwellings and
other real estate in 1983/84 to 31.7 per cent for Owner occupied housing in 1992/93. For most
variables the share of imputations increased over time, perhaps indicating a little detoriation in
data quality.
4 To compensate for missing data the multiple imputation technique suggested by
Rubin(1987) was used. (For additional details see Appendix!)5
The HINK-surveys of Statistics Sweden
A second source of household wealth data is the HINK survey administered by Statistics
Sweden. This is an annual survey which started in the end of the 1970’s and it is based on
random samples from the population of all noninstitutionalized Swedish households. The
sample sizes of the 1983, 1985 and 1992 waves were as large as 9584, 9508 and 12484
households respectively. Most data were obtained from self-reported tax returns which were
supplemented with survey data covering socio-demographic information, labor market
experience etc not included in the tax files. In each year stocks of assets were registered as of
December 31.
The reliance on tax data has advantages as well as disadvantages. Some assets are very
accurately reported, for instance listed shares and bank deposits. All banks and stock market
brokers nowadays report all holdings and transactions of their customers directly to the tax
authorities. So called lottery bonds are, however, not covered by this information network and
the value of this asset is likely to be underreported in HINK. Data on liabilities are of relatively
good quality because taxpayers have incentives to report them and claim deductions for
interest paid.
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Ownership of real estate is well reported in HINK while the value of  a property is
obtained as the product of  its tax assessed value multiplied by a regional estimate of the ratio
of  the average market value and the average tax assessed value. These estimates are likely to
be good estimates of average market values but if house prices develop differently in different
segments of the market then the tails of the distributions will become incorrectly estimated (see
below).
For condominiums and other types of cooperative forms of ownership the HINK data are
not as good. The value of a condominium declared for taxation has usually very little relation
to the corresponding market value. In many cases the mortgages on the whole apartment
complex exceed the tax assessed value and then the  value of a condominium is set to zero
although its market value might be substantial. Further more, there are no regional coefficients
which could be used to adjust the declared values to market values. The result is thus that the
HINK surveys seriously underestimate this type of asset. About 10 per cent of all households
live in condominiums, most of them in the major cities.
The quality of data for consumer durables is also very poor. Tax payers only have to
declare certain items like cars, pleasure boats, jewelry, antiques, paintings and other arts, but
there are problems with severe underreporting, and other consumption capital goods like6
appliances, electronic equipment, furniture, sports equipment etc are not reported for taxation
at all.
Life insurance policies are included to the extent they are declared for wealth taxation,
but private individual pension rights and future public and collective pension rights are not.
The HINK data, as well as any other data source including HUS, provide an incomplete
picture of assets and inventories associated with unincorporated business. There are problems
with their valuation and to determine what assets should be part of household wealth rather
than belong to the business sector.
A major disadvantage of the HINK data is the household definition used. Adults (18
years of age or older) who live in the same household without being married or cohabiting are
registered as separate households. This implies, for instance that parents and adult children
who live with their parents are considered separate households. Analogously, if an old mother
or father lives with a child. This is not unimportant. About 15 per cent of  all households are of
this type
6. Compared to a more conventional household definition the definition used in the
HINK survey is likely to increase the inequality of wealth. The survey will register an excessive
number of households with no or very little wealth.
A comparison between HUS and HINK
The HUS and HINK estimates of wealth components were compared in Bager-Sjögren &
Klevmarken (1993, 1995). As expected these comparisons showed differences which at least in
part could be traced to the differences in population coverage, household definition and in
evaluation of values. The smaller size of HUS also makes this survey more vulnerable to single
observations in the right tail of the wealth distribution. For instance, the share of households
who own their home is estimated to 52-53 per cent in HUS but only to 42-44 per cent in
HINK. The lower share in the HINK survey is at least partly  a result of the difference in
household definition. Adults who live with someone else without being married or cohabiting
are in HINK registered as separate nonowning households. Another possible partial
explanation is that condominiums are underreported in the self assessments. A taxpayer who
should declare a value of zero for his condominum might as well not report it at all. A third
explanation is the difference in population coverage. HUS does not include the very old
households, of which relatively few live in owner occupied houses.
In 1983/84 and 1985/86 the HUS estimates of the mean value of owner occupied houses
were a little higher than the HINK estimates but in 1992/93 they were much smaller. Part of7
the differences could be ascribed to random variation and probably also to the differences in
the evaluation of market values. Large, expensive houses have increased less in value than
small and medium sized houses. When average purchase coefficients are used in HINK to raise
tax assessed values to market values, the increase in value has been overestimated for the most
expensive houses. The HINK estimates at the 90th percentile are thus probably exaggerated.
The direction of change is, however, the same in both data sources: a decrease in value
between 1983/84 and 1985/86 and then an increase.
The share of owners of secondary dwellings and other real estate is also a little higher in
HUS compared to HINK. The most likely explanation is again the difference in household
definition. The mean value of this type of assets for those households who own it is much
higher in HUS than in HINK for all three years. Because this group of assets includes both
fram property and appartment complexes owned by households there are severe difficulties in
getting reliable estimates in both surveys. For instance, if the sample would happen to include a
family owning a few appartment complexes one year but not another year, then the difference
in means might become severely influenced. The HINK surveys also had special problems in
estimating the market value of these two assest in the years 1990-1992 due to the tax reform
and changed data collection routines.
7 There is a relatively large increase in the HUS estimate
1985/86 - 1992/93 mostly due to one extreme value. If  it is deleted the mean for 1992/93
drops by 23 per cent! Both data sources, however, show an increase in this wealth component.
The mean and the median values of bank deposits are very close for the first two years
but the HUS gives a higher estimate for 1992/93. The differences are larger in the 90th
percentile. For stocks and bonds there are also differences in estimates which are hard to
explain, in particular the low estimate for 1992/93 in HINK.
The share of households with liabilities is marginally higher in HINK which is as
expected because tax payers have incentives to report their debts to the tax authorities. There
are also differences in value estimates. HUS suggests that the real value of the liabilities of
Swedish households remained approximately constant between 1983/84 and 1985/86 and then
declined. In particular households with large liabilities would have decreased them. The HINK
data rather suggest an increase in liabilities and in particular in the right tail of the distribution!
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3. Total wealth and its components
Using HINK data which give more frequent estimates than HUS data, the estimates of net
wealth in constant prices show a decline from the end of the 1970s to the mid 1980s and then8
an increase until 1991 and after that again a decrease. For the periods at focus here 1983-1992
and 1985-1992, net wealth per household increased by 28 per cent and 21 per cent
respectively. The shares of owner occupied houses and secondary dwellings reached a peak in
1991 and then decreased marginally. The share of financial assets reached its peak already in
1988.
9
Now turning to HUS data, with only three time-points we will not be able to distinguish
the peak in net wealth in 1991, but only the net increase in the periods 1983-1992 and 1985-
1992. Tables 1 and 2 use the full information in the HUS surveys, i e including condominiums,
individual private life- and pension policies and consumer durables. The total wealth concept
based on these components is called ”extended wealth”, as compared to the more limited
definition of wealth used in the HINK. However, it does not include public and union related
pension rights, nor human capital. The first table gives estimates of  gross and net extended
wealth and its components in constant 1985 prices for all households and for those who have
assets. In the decade covered by the survey Swedish households have increased their net
wealth by some 40 per cent, and by the end of the period the mean net extended wealth
exceeds half a million crowns .
1011 This increase in net extended wealth is the result of  a
reduction in household debts and of an increase in all components of wealth except for owner
occupied housing and consumer durables. The share of owner occupied housing and consumer
durables of gross extended wealth has thus decreased. HUS data thus show a weaker growth
in the value of owner occupied houses than the HINK surveys do. For the reasons already
mentioned in section 2 HINK might exaggerate the increase in the market value of this asset.
As owner occupied homes and consumer durables are the dominating assets in the portfolio of
most households but the richest, these changes should have increased the inequality of the
distribution of wealth. Households have reallocated their wealth primarily to bank deposits,
private pension policies, and possibly to secondary dwellings and other real estate (note
however the uncertainty of these estimates as shown by the standard errors in the last three
columns of Table 1), and they have reduced their liabilities.
As shown by Table 2 most of these changes have taken place in the upper part of the
wealth distribution. The table shows means and portfolio shares of gross extend wealth for a
few deciles of net extended wealth. The share of owner occupied housing is smaller the richer
the household and it has also decreased  most for the richest. This is probably a result of  a
more rapid price decline on big, expensive houses compared to smaller houses. The share of
consumer durables is also smaller in the upper part of the distribution but it has decreased even9
further. The top decile has also reduced its share of stocks and bonds.  Wealthy households
have primary increased their share of secondary dwellings and other real estate and reduced
their liabilities.
12 The average increase in bank deposits noted in Table 1 is primarily traced to
the middle of the wealth distribution while the households in the top decile actually decreased
their share. Almost by definition the debt ratios are highest for the least wealthy households,
but it is interesting to note that they have increased their ratio while other households have
decreased their.
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The net result of all these changes is that net extended wealth has increased most in
absolute and relative terms for the most wealthy households while the lowest decile has
increased its debts.
These changes should be related to the major changes in the Swedish economy already
summarized in the introduction. The shares of each asset held by Swedish households was
influenced by changing asset prices and by new incentives to hold assets given by the new tax
system. Real estate prices peaked in the beginning of the 1990s and the subsequent fall was
enforced by the new tax system. The decrease in marginal tax rates decreased the value of
deductions, the most important being interest payments on mortgages, the old tax on imputed
incomes from housing was replaced by a flat rate real estate tax with the tax assessed value of
the property as a base. The tax on capital gains from owner occupied houses also changed. In
all the new tax system implied higher taxes on owner occupied homes. More or less consistent
with these changes is the observed no change 1985-1992 in investments in owner occupied
homes. The old tax system combined with high inflation gave incentives to finance purchases
of real estate and consumer durables by mortgages and loans and the debt ratio was relatively
high in the middle of the 1980s. The new tax system made liabilities relativly more expensive
and at the same time inflation started to decrease. Uncertainty about future incomes (increasing
unemployment) and about the future pension system contributed to the observed decrease in
household debts in the end of the period. Because consumption credits also became relatively
more expensive the share of counsumer durables was also decreased.
The new tax system made the taxation of bank deposits and bonds more equal to that of
other assets. As a result the share of bank deposits and bonds have increased. Although the
taxes on private investments in pension funds were increased this kind of asset still had a
favour relative to alternatives. The increased uncertainty about the future of the public pension
system also contributed to the increasing interest in private pension policies.10
It is of course very difficult to separate out the effects of the tax reform from alternative
explanantions. Supplementary information from the HUS surveys on respondents self-
evaluated responses to the tax changes is suggestive. Almost 29 per cent of all respondents
believed that the tax reform made them decrease their debt while close to 13 per cent thought
that they had increased their debt as a result of the tax reform. The responses depended on the
size of household net wealth in 1992. Among the 25 per cent most wealthy 39 per cent said
they had decreased their debts and 7 per cent that they had increased them, while in the least
wealthy quartile only about 25 per cent said they had decreased their debts and 23 per cent that
they had increased them.
There were also questions about savings behavior. Almost 38 per cent of the respondents
said that the tax reform made them save more, men more than women and well educated more
than respondents with a shorter schooling. Savings behavior is related to the size of disposable
income, and so were the responses to these questions. More than 52 per cent of the
respondents in the highest income quartile said that they saved more while only 26 per cent in
the lowest quartile gave this response. The decreased share of debts in the portfolio of
households could thus be the combined effect of reallocations within the portfolio and
increased net savings.
4. The inequality of wealth
Table 3 compares three different inequality measures computed for both data sources.
To preserve comparability between the two data sets the definitions of gross and net wealth are
the more limited ones excluding consumer durables and condominiums. A first observation is
that all the HINK data measures of inequality are higher than those using HUS data. The
difference is particularly large for the relative interquartile range. The most important
explanation is that the difference in household definition makes the interquartile range wider
and the median wealth smaller in HINK and a wider interquartile range is thus divided by a
smaller number. The difference in household definition is likely to influence the other two
measures in the same direction. It is also likely that the difference in population coverage, the
very old are not included in HUS, contributes to the differences in inequality. Please note that
the sampling and measurement errors which are likely to be larger in the smaller HUS survey
will work in the opposite direction, i.e. tend to inflate the inequality measures of HUS more
than those of HINK.11
One may also note both that the coefficient of variation is more sensitive to the tails of
the distribution than the two other measures as evidenced by the relatively large standard
errors, and that the inequality of net wealth is higher than that of gross wealth. The very
unequal distribution of liabilities explains the latter result.
The three measures do not give the same picture of changes in inequality during the
period of observation. The measures more sensitive to the tails of the distribution, the
coefficient of variation and the Gini coefficient indicate an increase in the inequality of net
wealth, while the relative interquartile range shows no increase or even a decrease. Any
increase in inequality should thus come from the extreme tails of the distribution.
14 The
standard errors of the estimates indicate, however that these changes are insignificant. Only the
increase in the Gini coefficient for Hink data will pass a significance test. (The large value of
the Gini coefficient for net wealth from HUS data in 1985/86 is the result of an outlier with a
large debt. The corresponding estimate for gross wealth does not give the same peak.) Both
data sources show that the changes in inequality of gross wealth are smaller than those for net
wealth. The relative interquartile range decreases while the other two measures either increase
a little or remain approximately constant. Most of the changes in inequality of net wealth
would thus seem to come from the changes in household debts. The same conclusion is
reached if a longer and more frequent series of Gini coefficients from the HINK surveys are
used. There is no trend in the inequality of gross wealth while the Gini coefficients for net
wealth start to increase in the beginning of the 1990s. If wealthy households decreased their
liabilities relatively more than poor households the inequality of net wealth should increase
more than the indequality of gross wealth.
Bager-Sjögren & Klevmarken (1993) demonstrated that the measures of inequality are
very sensitive to the definition of household wealth. If owner occupied houses and
condominiums are valued at market prices and if the wealth invested in consumer durables are
included, the inequality measures drops considerably. The same result is found if the inequality
measures of Table 4 using the extended wealth definition are compared to the measures of
Table 3. For instance, the Gini coefficient for the extended net wealth concept is about 70 per
cent of the Gini for the more limited wealth definition.
The inequality measures of extended wealth give a somewhat different picture of the
changes in inequality compared to the measures of the limited concept. The inequality of net
wealth shows a modest increase from the beginning of the 1980’s to the beginning of the
1990’s. The Gini coefficient and the relative interquartile range increased by about 10 per cent12
while the coefficient of variation doubled. The standard errors of the latter measure are,
however, very large. (The measures for 1985/86 are still influenced by the outlier mentioned
above although its influence is now more smoothed out.) A major difference compared to the
previous table is that the inequality of gross wealth increased about as much as the inequality
of net wealth. There is thus no longer any indication that the changes in household debt drove
the changes in the inequality of net wealth.
The same table also details each asset share of gross extended wealth and the
corresponding concentration coefficients. Consumer durables and bank deposits are the assets
least concentrated to the wealthy while stocks and other financial assets and secondary
dwellings and other real estate, and pension policies are the most concentrated. Owner
occupied houses have a concentration in between.
As the share of secondary dwellings and other real estate has increased so has the
concentration coefficient, indicating that investments in this asset have primarily been done by
the wealthy. As a contrast, investments in pension policies and stocks and bonds have become
less concentrated to the wealthy.
Following Podder(1993) the last panel of Table 4 details the effects of changes in the
components of wealth on the inequality of gross extended wealth by measures of elasticities of
the Gini coefficient with respect to the components of gross wealth.
15 For instance, the
elasticity of the Gini coefficient with respect to Secondary dwellings and other real estate was
0.13 in 1992/93, i e a 10 per cent proportional increase in this asset would increase the Gini
with 1.3 per cent.
16 The results show that increases in the assets Secondary dwellings and other
real estate and Stocks and bonds will increase the inequality in wealth, while increasing bank
deposits and investments in consumer durables will decrease inequality. Changes in the latter
asset, which is relatively evenly distributed among all households, have the strongest equalizing
effect.
The estimated elasticities are not constant. For Secondary dwellings and other real estate
the estimates increased more than four times in the period of observation. This is still another
way to demonstrate that this asset has become more unevenly distributed. For Owner occupied
housing and for Stocks and bonds the changes in elasticities go in the opposite direction. In the
beginning of the 1980’s an increase in the wealth endowed in owner occupied housing would
have increased inequality while ten years later it would result in a decrease. Increased
investments in Stocks and bonds still increase inequality but to a much lesser degree today than
in the beginning of the 1980’s. This is consistent with other information about a more13
widespread ownership of stocks and bonds, in particular through various types of investment
funds.
5. A multivariate analysis of changes 1985/86 - 1992/93 in net extended wealth
We have already noted that HINK data show a cyclical pattern in mean net wealth with a
trough in the mid 1980s and a peak in 1991. Using our more general definition of household
wealth we have found that the mean net extended wealth in constant prices increased from the
end of 1985 to the end of 1992, and that wealthy households have increased their wealth more
than less wealthy. The mean increased by 238 000 crowns 1985/86-1992/93 in the 1985 price
level (Rubin’s standard error was 46 000) while the median only increased by 4 000 crowns.
The percentiles demonstrate a considerable variability of the distribution of change. The 10th
percentile decreased by 116 000 and the 90th percentile increased by 121 000. Behind these
numbers thus lie very different experiences of the Swedish households. Which households
increased their wealth and which households decreased their? Guidance to an answer to this
question is obtained from Table 5 which displays the result from a heteroskedasticity corrected
regression of the changes in log net extended wealth on a set of explanatory variables.
17
A life-cycle interpretation of the accumulation of wealth gets a weak support.
Households with a head in the upper middle ages tend to increase their wealth more than other
households. There are no significant differences between the various family types. Education is
important. Those who have a head with a higher education increased their wealth more
compared to other households. There is also a very weak indication that a change in the
number of bread winners is of some importance.
Households who have invested a large share of their wealth in their own home have
taken advantage of the increased real estate prices and increased their wealth more than those
who rented an apartment. There were, however, no significant effect of having a secondary
dwelling or other real estate. An explanation is that this is a rather heterogeneous group of
assets the prices of which probably developed rather differently. Households which had a large
debt ratio in 1985/86 increased their wealth less than average and the same is true for those
who started with a large wealth relative to their disposable income. Finally, we also note that
the more a household increased its income the more wealth did it accumulate.14
6. The mobility of wealth 1985/86 - 1992/93
A review of the empirical literature
To analyze the mobility of wealth one does not only have the usual difficulties of getting good
wealth data, but repeated measurements on the same individuals or households are also
needed. There are thus relatively few studies of the mobility of wealth. The study by
Menchik(1979) on inter-generational wealth mobility is a relatively early one. He used a small
sample of wealthy Connecticut residents who died in the 1930s and 1940s. Mobility was
analysed by a regression of the logarithm of terminal wealth of the child, on what he called  the
logarithm of peak midparent wealth and a few controle variables. He found a 30 per cent
regression towards the mean and a partial correlation coefficient of 0.48 as a measure of inter-
generational (im)mobility. Steckel(1990) was probably one of the first to use national
longitudinal household data. He matched U.S. census data on real estate wealth from 1850 and
1860 for 1581 male-headed households. Using a transition matrix he found, for instance (p.
277), that among those with zero real estate in 1950, about 48 per cent also had zero real
estate in 1860 but nearly 30 per cent made it to the fifth decile or beyond. Among those in the
top decile in 1850 46.2 per cent remained in that position while 11.5 per cent fell below the
fifth decile in 1860. In the middle of the distribution mobility was relatively greater. Shorrocks’
measure of mobility was computed to 0.605.
18 Steckel also analysed the change in the
percentile position by an ordinary least-squares regression using as explanatory variables the
age of the head, number of children less than 10 and greater than or equal to 10 in 1850 and
1860, ethnicity, changes in occupation and changes in region. Among his results were that the
advancement towards more wealth declined by age. Illiterate and blacks added relatively less to
wealth, while the number of children and their age composition were insignificant. Those who
continued as unskilled and blue collar workers declined relative to those who remained farmers
or white-collar workers.
The same kind of study was later repeated by Steckel & Krishnan(1992), but now using
the sub samples of older men and mature women of the National Longitudinal Survey from the
mid 1960s to the mid 1970s. Their measure of wealth included real property in houses or
farms, business assets, other property and financial assets less personal loans and other
liabilities. It did not include pension or annuity wealth, nor automobiles. A transition matrix
showed that 67 per cent of those who were in the two lowest deciles in the beginning of the
period remained there at the end. 58.4 per cent of those who were in the 10th decile remained
there. Those who moved from the bottom or from the top of the wealth distribution generally15
did not move very far. The Shorrocks measure was 0.773. Steckel also found that the greatest
absolute but smallest relative gains occured for those who were wealthy in the beginning of the
period and that the smallest absolute and greatest relative gains occured among the least
wealthy. The change in percentile regression showed a negative effect of increasing age of the
head, a significantly positive effect of more than 12 years of schooling, and persitent residence
in the south increased the household’s relative position compared to those who moved or
stayed out of the south. Marital history had a major impact on mobility. People who remained
single declined in relative postion and so did those who divorced or became widowed. The
decline was particularly strong for women. Occupational history also influenced mobility. For
instance, persistent farmers and blue collar workers who changed to a white collar job
increased their relative position.
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The mobility in the bottom and in the top of the wealth distribution was analyzed
separately using logit models. This analysis showed that age had no effect on persistance or
movements into the bottom while the number of dependents, being black, having less than 12
years of schooling, being persistently single and becoming divorced or widowed increased the
probability both to remain in the bottom and to move into the bottom. Families with an old
head had a higher probability to remain in the top of the wealth distribution. Being nonblack,
having more than 12 years of schooling, not being single or becoming divorced or widowed
also increased the probability. The same characteristics also increased the probabilty to move
into the top except for the age variable which was insignificant. The number of dependents had
a negative effect on this probability but no significant effect on the probability to remain in the
top.
An even more recent study is Hurst et al (1996) using the PSID for the period 1984-
1994. In this case the wealth measure included real estate, farm or business assets, financial
assets including life insurance policies and accumulation of pensions, vehicles, and less debts. A
transition matrix shows that 58.9 per cent of those who were in the first two deciles in 1984
remained there in 1994, and 53.3 per cent remained in the top decile. These estimates are a
little lower than in Steckel & Krishnan(1992). The Shorrocks measure computed from the
transition matrix is 0.80. The over all mobility is thus only marginally higher than that observed
by Steckel & Krishnan(1992). There are also probit estimates of staying in the bottom decile
1984-1989 and of falling into the bottom decile. The results show that the age of the head and
marital status have no significant effect on the probability to stay while increasing incomes,
both permanent and transitory, decrease the probability. The probability to fall into the bottom16
decile decreased with increasing age of the head and increasering (permanent) income, while it
was high for persitently single and for those who changed marital status compared to those
who were presistently nonsingle.
Finally we will also review a few results from a European study, Bentzen & Schmidt-
Sörensen(1994) using Danish data for the period 1983-1990. Their wealth data originated from
amounts declared to the tax authorities and included real estate and financial assets less
liabilities, but not pension or annuity wealth. The transition matrix from this study shows that
only 42.5 per cent of those who were in the two bottom deciles in 1983 remained there in
1990, while 68 per cent of those who were in the top decile remained there. The corresponding
Shorrocks measure was 0.78. Compared to the two modern time U.S. studies the Danish
distribution of wealth is thus more mobile in the bottom and less mobile in the top, while
Shorrocks over all mobility measure is about the same. The U.S. data included both the white
and nonwhite populations and it is conceivable that a transition matrix  for whites only would
have shown a higher mobility in the bottom of the distribution more similar to the Danish.
A comparison of the average decile position in 1983 and 1990 by various sub groups of
the sample shows, for instance, that those who were youngest in 1983 lost in relative position.
Self-employed, managers and salaried employees in leading positions increased their relative
wealth ranking. House owners also made major gains as did those who had more than 12 years
of schooling. Being or becoming single decreased the average wealth percentile.
It is of course difficult to compare across these studies as they use data which have been
collected in different ways for slightly different populations and not using exactly the same
definitions of net wealth. However, a few general observations can be made. Wealth mobility
depends on the position in the life-cycle. Except possibly for the very young, young and middle
aged increase their wealth relatively rapidly. Those who have a higher education and get
managerial and similar white-collar jobs also increase their relative wealth postition. Marital
status and changes in marital status are important. Singles have a disadvantage and becoming
divorced or widowed decreases the ranking. Finally we might also note that the portefolio
composition is important. The Danish study is an example of the importance of having assets
which increase in value relative to other assets, in this case of owning a home.17
The mobility of wealth in Sweden
In this section we take advantage of the panel properties of the HUS data and analyze the
mobility of wealth 1985/86 - 1992/93. First, a simple transition matrix is computed and
compared to the studies reviewed above and then the mobility in decile ranks is analyzed in a
multivariate approach.
Table 6 is a transition matrix , which gives the estimated probability to leave a given  net
wealth decile in 1985/86 for another decile of net wealth in 1992/93. For instance, the
probability to go from the first to the second decile is estimated to 13 per cent. The diagonal
elements give the probabilities to remain in the same decile. For each row the estimates thus
sum to 100.
The probability to remain in the same decile ranges from 9 per cent to 52 per cent with
the highest estimates in both ends of the wealth distribution. Mobility is thus much higher in
the middle of the distribution than in the ends, or to put it differently, the probability to remain
poor or wealthy is higher than the probability to keep an average wealth. The 47 per cent
which remained in the two bottom deciles is smaller than in the U.S studies and only marginally
higher than in the Danish study. The mobility in the top, 52 per cent remained in the top, is
about the same as in the U.S. study based on the PSID, but higher than in Denmark. The
Shorrocks measure is higher than in any of the other studies, 0.87.
20 In these comparisons one
has to bear in mind that the time periods covered are of diffent lengths. The two modern time
U.S. studies covered ten years periods while the Danish and Swedish studies covered  seven
years periods. If the Scandinavian studies had also covered ten years it is likely that they had
shown an even higher mobility. With the reservation that the data sets are not fully comparable
we conclude that wealth mobility is higher in Sweden than in the two other countries.
To analyze who is gaining in decile rank and who is loosing a multinomial model was
estimated. The categorical dependent variable takes three values: decrease in decile rank, no
change and increase in decile rank. The first group is the comparison group. The bottom and
top deciles were dropped from the analysis because households in these two deciles can
obviously only move in one direction. The mobility of these two deciles were analyzed in two
separate logit analysises. The degree of mobility is obviously state dependent, c f Table 6, and
for this reason dummy variables for the deciles 2-4 and 6-9 were included in the model. Decile
5 is the decile of reference. Our sample includes both stable households and households which
have experienced marriages, separations, the death of a spouse and other changes in their
composition. Some of these changes may greatly influence the wealth of a household. With the18
current definition of a household, those who live jointly with a designated head
21, a separation
may reduce the wealth of the head’s household by half. The main rule at a separation is that the
wealth of the household is split equally between the separating spouses. To controle for these
changes in the composition of the household a few dummy variables for family type and
changes in marital status were introduced. In addition the model includes dummy variables for:
age group in 1986, the schooling of the head in 1986, if the household in 1986 had a secondary
dwelling or other real estate, if it lived in an owner occupied home, and if it in 1986 had
liabilities.
The parameter estimates are presented in Table 7 and predicted shares in Table 8. The
model does a decent but not a very good job in predicting the observed outcome. The state
dependencies comes out clearly in the estimates. The probability to advance in rank or remain
in the same decile is relatively higher in the bottom deciles and lower in the top deciles.
Households which experienced a separation or the death of a spouse have a high probability of
loosing in rank. Those who persistently had single heads were also more likely to loose in rank
than to gain, and if these single heads had children their probability to loose was even higher.
These results are consistent both with prior expectations and with previous results. The
importance of separations to explain mobility and the relatively high separation rates in Sweden
might contribute to the explanation of the difference in over all mobility between Sweden and
the United States.
Households in the age bracket 55-64 years have a relatively high probability to gain in
decile rank or at least not to loose in rank. This is consistent with a decreasing obligation to
provide for children in this age bracket, with both spouses working in the market and with
amortized mortgages. Very young households and retirees are on the other hand not likely to
gain in rank. Schooling significantly influence the relative probability to increase in decile rank.
Households with a head who has a college or university education has a higher probability to
increase in rank than households with less schooling.
The household’s portfolio position in 1985/86 significantly influenced its chances to
advance in rank. Households with an owner occupied home, with a secondary dwelling or
other real estate and households with liabilities all had higher probabilities to increase their
decile rank. The marginal effects on the three probabilities are shown in Table 9. For instance,
the probability to loose in rank is 0.21 less for a household with an owner occupied home than
for a household without one and the probability to gain in rank is 0.19 higher. The value of
owner occupied homes have obviously increased so much that the wealth of owners have19
increased significantly. The marginal effect of secondary dwellings and other real estates is
similar but on average not as high.  One interpretation of the positive marginal effect of
liabilities in 1985/86 is that the tax reforms have given households sufficient incentives to
reduce their debts and thus advance i decile rank. Another interpretation is that the relatively
high inflation in the second half of the 1980’s has reduced the real value of liabilities.
The estimates of two logit models, one for the probability to advance from the lowest
decile and one for the probability to leave the highest decile, are presented in Table 10. They
show that households with a head above 64 years of age, i e in most cases a retired head, have
a higher probability to leave the bottom decile than all other households. For this group of
households retirement might mean both a regular pension income and a need for less expenses,
and thus an opportunity to reduce their liabilities. The positive effect of liabilities with a P-
value of 0.07 supports this interpretation. Also for households in the bottom decile the
probability to advance is positively related to having an owner occupied home. The marginal
effect is relatively large, on average 16 per cent of the point estimate, i e about 0.7! At
conventional levels all estimates of the model for the probability to leave the 10th decile are
insignificant and the model does not do a very good job in predicting these transitions. We thus
have to conclude either that the sample is too small to give significant effects or that the
probability to leave the top decile has explanations different from mobility in the rest of the
wealth distribution.
7. Conclusions
From the beginning of the 1980’s to the beginning of the 1990’s household extended wealth
increased by about 40 per cent in real terms and the mean wealth of a Swedish household
exceeded half a million crowns at the end of the period. More recent data indicate though a
decline in average household wealth. Behind these figures we have found major changes both
in the portfolio composition and in the inequality of wealth which can be related to market and
policy changes which have taken place in this period.
Considering the whole period we have found that Swedish households have decreased
their liabilities and increased their assets in primarily bank deposits, private pensions and
secondary dwellings. The wealth invested in owner occupied homes decreased in value in the
first half of the period and increased in the second. According to our estimates the mean real
value of owner occupied housing was about the same in the beginning and the end of the
period. Other sources suggest that behind the average increase 1985/86-1992/93 lay first a20
major increase in the house prices until 1991 and then a drop after the tax reform and in the
subsequent recession.
These changes in the distribution of wealth are consistent with what we know about
price changes on assets and the predicted consequences of the tax reform. As predicted,
liabilities and the value of consumer durables have decreased and the holdings of bank deposits
have increased. The value of real estate was predicted to decrease as a result of the tax reform,
and HINK-data suggest that they have decreased after 1991, but the observed changes have
also been influenced by the volatile price changes in the real estate markets unrelated to the tax
reform and it is difficult to isolate the effects of the tax reform.
The largest changes in portfolio composition has occurred among the most wealthy and
they have also increased their wealth relatively more than the less wealthy. As a result the
inequality of the wealth distribution has increased. Inequality estimates are sensitive both to the
definition of wealth and to the particular inequality index. Our data suggest that the Gini
coefficient for extended wealth has increased by some 10 per cent.
The increase in inequality is also a result of the change in portfolio composition. The
increased investments, in secondary dwellings and other real estate, private pension policies
and in stocks and bonds, have increased inequality. The decreased investments in consumer
durables worked in the same direction as well as the shift in the debt burden from the wealthy
to the less wealthy. The only change which decreased inequality was the increase in bank
deposits.
The decrease in the value of owner occupied housing in the beginning of the period
probably contributed, but only marginally, to an increase in inequality, but at the end of the
period the same increase would have resulted in a small decrease in inequality. Taken over the
whole period the changes in the value of owner occupied houses probably did not effect
inequality much, but the decrease in housing values which followed the tax reform should have
contributed to the increase in inequality. Additional effects of the tax reform on the distribution
of wealth are not so easy to distinguish. Pure portfolio reallocations should not immediately
influence net wealth. Only differential changes in the return on assets will after some time
change the distribution of net wealth.
The subjective responses to the tax reform summarized in section 3 of this paper
indicated that the reform had increased savings and reduced liabilities, and our analysis of
changes in wealth showed that increases in incomes increased wealth. The increase in
disposable income which was the combined effect of tax and transfer changes for many21
households could thus have contributed to a reduction in liabilities and an increased
accumulation of wealth, changes which primarily took place in the upper half of the wealth
distribution.
These results are supported and further detailed by our analysis of the mobility of wealth.
Households who owned real estate and had liabilities in the middle of the 1980’s had a higher
chance than other households to increase their rank in the wealth distribution.
Studies of mobility of wealth are rather few, but comparing our results with a few results
from the United States and Denmark indicated that mobility is relatively high in Sweden. This
result might seem counter intuitive, because allegedly the United States is a country in which
the self-made man can advance from nothing into wealth, while taxation would make this much
more difficult in Sweden. However, mobility is measured relative to the inequality of wealth in
each country. The greater inequality of wealth in the United States implies that a move of one
decile in this country is a longer move than a decile in Sweden. If the distance of a move had
been measured in an absolute sense mobility might have turned out higher in the United States.
Another interpretation is that the nonwhite population in the United States have relatively little
wealth and low mobility compared to the white population, while there is no such
subpopulation in Sweden. A third explanation, supported by our analysis but still somewhat
speculative is that the relatively high separation rates in Sweden explain at least part of the
differences in mobility between the two countries.
Additional results which aggree well with those of previous studies are that mobility up
the distribution primarily takes place among middle aged and among those with a university
education.22
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Table 1. Mean extended net and gross wealth, shares of households holding assets and mean holdings. (All values are in
thousands of SEK and in real prices dec -85=100. Standard errors in italics.)





  83/84 %   85/86 %   92/93 % 83/84 85/86 92/93 83/84 85/86 92/93
Net extended wealth 412 411 598
Gross extended wealth 539 574 722
Owner occupied housing 236 0.44 211 0.37 237 0.33 0.61 0.61 0.61 385 347 388
12 8 12
Sec dwell & other real est 60 0.11 88 0.15 172 0.24 0.25 0.28 0.31 239 312 562
17 60 112
Life insurance policies *  - 6 0.01 7 0.01  - 0.14 0.14  - 43 55
67
Private pension policies*  - 8 0.01 24 0.03  - 0.14 0.33  - 54 72
75
Bank deposits** 38 0.07 45 0.08 75 0.1 1.00 1.00 1.00 38 45 75
223
Stocks & bonds** 40 0.07 36 0.06 48 0.07 1.00 1.00 1.00 39 36 48
545
Consumer durables** 166 0.31 179 0.31 159 0.22 1.00 1.00 1.00 166 179 159
445
Debts 127 0.23 163 0.28 124 0.17 0.70 0.76 0.74 182 213 168
61 1 6
Sample size    1505    1772    1150
* Component not observed for 1983/94
**  These assets are observed by intervals and zero holdings is included in the first interval.
Estimates are based on ten replications; owner occupied housing includes condominiums and other co-operatively owned apartments25













83/84 85/86 92/93 83/84 85/86 92/93 83/84 85/86 92/93 83/84 85/86 92/93 83/84 85/86 92/93
Net extended wealth -18 -188 -32 111 107 147 266 284 325 559 566 731 1415 1549 2546
Gross extended
wealth
94 221 116 176 189 242 399 403 442 711 719 859 1637 1764 2717
Owner occupied
housing
36 112 45 60 73 89 204 161 178 337 282 351 639 472 585
Sec dwell & other
real est
4 18 2 5 10 13 37 30 29 60 74 111 298 509 1248
Life insurance
policies
** 1 1 ** 1 2 ** 2 1 ** 5 9 ** 33 31
Private pension
policies
** 2 1 ** 1 2 ** 2 8 ** 5 30 ** 48 110
Bank deposits 8 14 13 17 20 36 40 30 51 48 57 110 101 125 178
Stocks & bonds 2 16 4 8 7 8 13 11 17 22 33 36 262 215 260
Consumer durables 43 59 49 86 76 91 105 167 157 244 261 212 336 361 305













83/84 85/86 92/93 83/84 85/86 92/93 83/84 85/86 92/93 83/84 85/86 92/93 83/84 85/86 92/93
Owner occupied
housing
38% 51% 39% 34% 39% 37% 51% 40% 40% 47% 39% 41% 39% 27% 22%
Sec dwell & other
real est
5% 8% 2% 3% 5% 5% 9% 7% 7% 9% 10% 13% 18% 29% 46%
Life insurance
policies
1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 1% 1% 2% 1%
Private pension
policies
1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 4% 3% 4%
Bank deposits 9% 6% 11% 10% 11% 15% 10% 8% 12% 7% 8% 13% 6% 7% 7%
Stocks & bonds 2% 7% 4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 4% 3% 5% 4% 16% 12% 10%
Consumer durables 46% 27% 43% 49% 40% 38% 26% 41% 36% 34% 36% 25% 21% 20% 11%
Debts 120% 185% 128% 37% 43% 39% 33% 29% 26% 21% 21% 15% 14% 12% 6%
*Estimates are based on ten replications of data. **Component not observed.26
Table 3. Wealth inequality measures using HUS and HINK data.




Net wealth 1.79 3.87 3.36
0.11 1.10 0.85
Gross wealth 1.31 2.17 2.57
0.08 0.68 0.68
Gini coefficient
Net wealth 0.74 0.93 0.76
0.02 0.05 0.02
Gross wealth 0.58 0.59 0.62
0.01 0.02 0.03
Relative interquartile range
Net wealth 2.71 2.90 2.58
Gross wealth 1.92 1.88 1.83
HINK
Coefficient of variation
Net wealth 2.18 2.47 2.90
0.12 0.20 0.34
Gross wealth 2.02 2.42 2.01
0.22 0.27 0.21
Gini coefficient
Net wealth 0.85 0.88 0.92
0.02 0.02 0.01
Gross wealth 0.69 0.68 0.68
0.01 0.01 0.00
Relative interquartile range
Net wealth 5.90 5.32 6.09
Gross wealth 5.13 4.52 4.73
*The estimates from HUS are based on one replication of data (see section 2 and appendix).
Note: The limited definition of wealth excluding consumer durables etc. has been used for both
data sources.27
Table 4.  Inequality, concentration and elasticity measures using HUS data and the extended
wealth definition.
Standard error in italics*
83/84 85/86 92/93
Coefficient of variation
Net wealth 1.14 2.06 2.25
0.06 0.59 0.59
Gross wealth 1.00 1.50 1.89
0.05 0.42 0.50
Gini coefficient
Net wealth 0.52 0.59 0.58
0.01 0.03 0.02
Gross wealth 0.47 0.48 0.52
0.01 0.02 0.02
Relative interquartile range
Net wealth 1.38 1.44 1.54
Gross wealth 1.39 1.31 1.30
Share of total gross wealth (%)
Secondary dwelling & other real estate         11         15       24
Owner occupied housing         44         37       33
Life insurance policies         **           1         1
Private pension policies         **           2         3
Bank deposits           7           8       10
Stocks and bonds           7           6         7
Consumer durables          31          31       22
Gross wealth        100        100     100
Concentration coefficient
Secondary dwelling & other real estate       0.60       0.70    0.80
Owner occupied housing       0.51       0.49    0.49
Life insurance policies       **       0.48    0.52
Private pension policies       **       0.82    0.68
Bank deposits       0.34       0.36    0.32
Stocks and bonds       0.72       0.71    0.60
Consumer durables       0.33       0.33    0.28
Elasticity of GINI coefficient with respect to component
Secondary dwelling & other real estate 0.03 0.07 0.13
Owner occupied housing 0.04 0.01 -0.02
Life insurance policies ** 0.00 0.00
Private pension policies ** 0.01 0.01
Bank deposits -0.02 -0.02 -0.04
Stocks and bonds 0.04 0.03 0.01
Consumer durables -0.09 -0.10 -0.10
*These estimates are based on one replication of HUS data.
**Component not observed.28
Table 5. Parameter estimates from a weighted regression explaining the change
1984/85 - 1992/93 in the log of net extended wealth.
Independent variables Coefficient Std.Err P>|t|
Age of household head
35-54 0.0664 0.0849 0.3021
55-64 0.1461 0.0970 0.0924
65 and above -0.0330 0.1111 0.5326
Family type
Single adult with children -0.2368 0.3099 0.3090
Two adults without children -0.0550 0.1063 0.4201
Two adults with children 0.0850 0.1144 0.3153
Schooling
10 to 12 years -0.0587 0.0681 0.2701
More than 12 years 0.1518 0.0625 0.0160
Value of sec. dwellings and other real estate
     as a share of gross wealth
0.0013 0.0016 0.3111
Value of owner occupied home as a share
     of gross wealth 0.0057 0.0015 0.0000
Liabilities as a share of gross wealth -85 -0.0030 0.0021 0.0993
Log of ratio: Wealth -85/disposable income -85 -0.3787 0.0356 0.0000
Change in the log of disposable income 0.2900 0.0493 0.0000
Change in no of employed adults 0.0469 0.0397 0.1653
Intercept 0.4114 0.1327 0.0020
Note 1. The weights used to compensate for heteroskedasticity are the inverse of the square  root of 
the predicted values from a regression of the squared OLS residuals on the independent 
variables above and the interactions of the continuous variables.
Note 2. This analysis is based on only one replication of data. The no of observations is 606.
Note 3. Reference family type is single adult without children and reference level of schooling is compulsory 
schooling, i.e. less than 10 years.29
Table 6. Transition matrix between deciles of net extended wealth 85/86 and deciles of net
extended wealth 92/93. (Row frequencies sum to 100.)
Decile of distribution of net extended wealth 92/93
123456789 1 0
1 36 1 3 2 1 9415334
21 9 26 10 13 7 12 4 3 4 1
31 2 2 1 16 1 8 1 2 94611
Decile of
distribution of 41 4 1 7 1 3 10 1 2 88781
net extended
wealth 85/86 58 7 1 21 9 9 18 11 7 4 4
6 5 8 8 14 21 17 8773
70 3 1 1 7 1 2 9 13 19 19 6
8 24536 1 9 2 1 13 17 10
9 213476 1 4 2 4 21 18
1 0 100271 1 0 1 0 1 7 52
Note: This table is based on data from one replication of  HUS data
with a sample size of 777 households.30
Table 7.  Multinomial logit model of decile wealth mobility.
Variables Parameter t-ratio P-value
estimate
No change
Decil 2  2.596  4.957 0.000
Decil 3  1.233  2.427 0.015
Decil 4   .174  0.333 0.739
Decil 6   .215  0.445 0.656
Decil 7   .186  0.368 0.713
Decil 8  -.491 -0.974 0.330
Decil 9  -.108 -0.224 0.823
Single-single   .013  0.036 0.971
Single-union   .822  1.672 0.095
Union-single  -.636 -1.575 0.115
Mstatus undetermined   .524  1.017 0.309
Age18-34   .336  0.691 0.489
Age 35-54   .898  2.049 0.040
Age 55-64  1.212  2.812 0.005
Sec.dwell. & o. real estate   .442  1.744 0.081
Owner occupied home   .781  2.474 0.013
Liabilities   .548  1.626 0.104
Singles with children -1.758 -1.514 0.130
High school, etc  -.052 -0.165 0.869
College, university   .203  0.748 0.454
Intercept -3.375 -5.604 0.000
Increased decile rank
Decile 2  2.064  5.141 0.000
Decile 3   .979  2.759 0.006
Decile 4  -.006 -0.019 0.985
Decile 6 -1.160 -3.261 0.001
Decile 7  -.366 -1.082 0.279
Decile 8 -1.519 -4.307 0.000
Decile 9 -1.993 -5.149 0.000
Single-single  -.870 -2.833 0.005
Single-union   .292  0.691 0.489
Union-single  -.853 -2.861 0.004
Mstatus undetermined   .270  0.576 0.565
Age 18-34  -.188 -0.545 0.586
Age 35-54   .209  0.684 0.494
Age 55-64   .634  2.086 0.037
Sec.dwell. & o. real estate   .374  1.808 0.071
Owner occupied home  1.227  4.937 0.000
Liabilities   .390  1.490 0.136
Singles with children -1.616 -1.957 0.050
High school, etc.  -.059 -0.228 0.820
College, university   .674  3.062 0.002
Intercept -1.421 -3.627 0.000
________________________________________________________________________________
Note:  The bottom and top deciles were deleted from this analysis. Reference familytype/marital status is a




No of observations 77731
Table 8. Predicted shares of rank changes
Predicted Observed
Decrease No change Increase
Decreased decile rank 0.561 0.139 0.300 0.456
Unchanged decile rank 0.404 0.195 0.401 0.157
Increased decile rank 0.352 0.163 0.485 0.387
All deciles 0.456 0.157 0.387
Table 9. Marginal effects of selected variables
Variable       Change in probability to have a
decrease no change  increase
Sec.dwell. & o. real estate -0.078  0.032  0.046
Owner occupied home -0.214  0.025  0.188
Liabilities -0.088  0.043  0.04632
Table 10. Logit estimates of the probability to leave respectively the bottom and top decile.
    Probability to leave the bottom decile  Probability to leave the top decile
Variable Slope        t-ratio        P-value          Slope       t-ratio     P-value
Single-single  0.082   0.123 0.902  1.659  1.306 0.192
Single-union -0.313  -0.352 0.725
Union-single -0.766  -0.848 0.396  0.690  0.833 0.405
Age 18-34 -1.284 -1.008 0.313  0.991  0.753 0.451
Age 35-54 -1.759 -1.438 0.150 -0.655 -1.006 0.314
Age 55-64 -1.779 -1.368 0.171 -0.994 -1.577 0.115
Sec. dwellings,
o. real estate -1.805 -1.186 0.235  0.306  0.617 0.538
Owner occupied home  4.414  2.908 0.004  0.426  0.419 0.675
Liabilities  1.417  1.778 0.075 -1.166  -1.286  0.198
Singles with children  0.681   0.509 0.611
High school, etc  0.418   0.504 0.614  0.767  1.290 0.197
College, university -0.037  -0.047 0.963  1.252  1.881 0.060
Intercept  0.118   0.102 0.918  0.484  0.363 0.717
Log  likelihood -44.102 -60.283
Pseudo R
2   0.289  0.103
No of observations  97  97
Mean predicted probability
   household did not change   0.435  0.421
   household changed decile   0.742  0.553
Observed share of change   0.639  0.46833
APPENDIX. Rubin’s multiple imputation procedure
In brief the Rubin(1987) multiple imputation approach can be described as follows. Suppose y1
y2 y3  ... yk are k asset types and x1 x2 x3 ..... xs are s socio-demographic variables
22. Assume,
for instance, that for a particular household i  there is partial nonresponse on the first two asset
variables. Using all complete observations one regression  equation was estimated with y1 as
the dependent variable and y3 - yk and x1 - xs as independent variables, and one equation with
the same explanatory variables but with y2 as the dependent variable. The estimated equations
were then used to predict the missing data on y1 and y2. To preserve the variance of the
original data a randomly drawn residual from the regression was added to the prediction. The
same regressions were used for all households with missing values on the first two assets. For
households with missing values on other assets than the first two new regressions were
estimated following the same principle. For some assets with missing values one would have to
determine if a household would have that asset at all before an imputed value could be
assigned. In this case two equations were estimated one to determine the possession of an asset
and one for the value of the asset conditional on possession.
The imputation technique introduces random errors into the imputed data set because the
parameters of the regression equations are estimated and because regressions residuals are
randomly assigned to the imputed values. To estimate the relative importance of these
imputation errors each missing data point was imputed ten times. The ten replications were
obtained in the following way. For each replication new regression parameters were drawn
from a multivariate normal distribution with a mean equal to the regression estimates and a
covariance matrix equal to the estimated covariance matrix of  the regression estimates. New
residuals were also drawn for each replication. In this way we obtained ten different data sets,
one for each replication. Observed data points were copied into each data set. Any statistic can
thus be estimated ten times once for each data set and the variance between the replications


























and  $ q1 is the parameter estimate from the lth replication,  qM  the mean over all M replications
and  W is the mean over all replications of the variance estimates of  $ q1. In our case M is 10.
Following Rubin(1987) one can interpret the ratio of the between replication variance
and the total variance as a measure of the information missing due to partial nonresponse.
Table A.1 exhibits estimates of the between replication variance, the total variance and their
ratio for the means of  seven assets and the mean of all liabilities. Estimates are given for each
of the years 1983/84, 1985/86 and 1992/93. The table shows that the imputation share of the
variance varies from a few per cent to almost 30 per cent of the total for some assets.
However, it is interesting to note that the between replication variance is relatively small for
the total, net extended wealth. The explanation is probably that a randomly large imputation of
one type of asset is compensated by a relatively small imputed value for another type. The
properties of the imputation procedure mimics those of real data. An implication of this result
is that it is relatively ”safe” to use only one replication in an analysis of total net extended
wealth. Table 2.1 also indicates that the relative importance of the imputation variance was
higher in 1992/93 than in the previous two years.
Finally we should note that the whole imputation approach rests on the assumption that the
probability to respond on the question about a particular asset is independent of  the
residual of the regression equation of this asset. If this would not be true and the partial
nonresponse selective in this sense, the imputation procedure will not correct for this
selectivity.
Table A.1. Estimated between and total variances of the mean of each wealth
component and the share of information missing due to partial nonresponse. Values
in current prices.
Between variance Total variance Share
´105 ´105
Cross-section 1983/84
Owner occupied housing* 27.37 122.32 0.22





Bank deposits 0.26 3.05 0.09
Stocks and bonds 1.56 25.29 0.06
Consumer durables 1.92 17.97 0.11
Debts* 4.80 40.49 0.12
Net  extended wealth$ 11.15 171.61 0.0735
Table A.1 continues
Cross-section 1985/86
Owner occupied housing* 7.63 57.03 0.13
Sec dwell & other real
estate*
19.63 3361.10 0.01
Life insurance policies * 4.63 42.06 0.11
Private pension policies* 6.05 42.64 0.14
Bank deposits 0.29 3.53 0.08
Stocks and bonds 0.96 17.10 0.06
Consumer durables 3.47 18.02 0.19
Debts* 13.38 114.83 0.12
Net  extended wealth 11.54 425.60 0.03
Panel 1992/93
Owner occupied housing* 34.43 132.96 0.26
Sec dwell & other real
estate*
224.45 12662.33 0.02
Life insurance policies * 3.60 42.76 0.08
Private pension policies* 4.43 29.19 0.15
Bank deposits 2.94 11.99 0.24
Stocks and bonds 6.08 23.22 0.26
Consumer durables 5.44 21.14 0.26
Debts* 2.71 36.46 0.07
Net extended wealth 27.20   1630.48 0.01
The sample sizes were: 1983/84 1505, 1985/86 1772, and 1992/93 1150.
*The estimated mean is conditioned on ownership
§The variable was not observed this year
$ Net extended wealth is the sum of all assets listed in this table, see section 3.
                                               
1 For this study we were only able to use the 1993 panel. A new supplementary sample was not
yet available for analysis. Preliminary comparisons of a few marginal distributions show no
major differences. The supplementary sample has marginally higher estimates of wealth in
owner occupied homes and of mortgages, and marginally smaller estimates of financial assets
compared to the panel.
2Kapitalförsäkringar
3Lottery bonds were not always declared for taxation and the authorities had no register which
covered owners of these bonds.
4For details see the Appendix table in Bager-Sjögren & Klevmarken(1995).
5One exception is students’ loans the interest of which is not deductible.
6In the HUS surveys 16 per cent of all households had more than two adults in 1984. The
corresponding estimates for 1986 and 1993 were respectively 20 per cent and 14 per cent. In
the 1993 wave of HINK a new household concept similar to ours was introduced parallel to36
                                                                                                                                                  
the old concept. A comparison showed that the number of households according to the old
definition exceeded that of the new by 13.7 per cent. (Statistiska Meddelanden Be21 SM 9501,
Table 54)
7Personal communication with Kjell Jansson, Statistics Sweden.
8Another source of comparisons is the aggregate national accounts statistics. The difference in
population coverage and evaluation principles is, however, even larger than in the comparison
with HINK. For a discussion see Bager-Sjögren & Klevmarken (1995) footnote 5.
9Tables 36, 39 and 40, Inkomstfördelningsundersökningen Be21 SM 9501,Statistics Sweden.
10The point estimate of 598 000 crowns for 1992/93 is influenced by an outlier with a very high
value in Secondary dwellings and other real estate. If this outlier is deleted the point estimate
drops by about 40 000.
11 Half a million Swedish crowns approximately equaled 65-70 thousands US dollars.
12 The top decile includes an outlier in the category ”Secondary dwellings and other real
estate” of 50 million crowns. If this household is removed from the analysis the mean drops
from 1248 thousands to 820 thousands and the share of secondary dwellings and other real
estate decreases to 35 per cent. The share of owner occupied housing increases to 25 per cent
and the remaining shares increase one or two percentage points.
13 This is further evidenced in Figures 3.1a and 3.1b in Bager-Sjögren & Klevmarken(1995),
which compared debt ratios by wealth decile using both with HUS and HINK data.
14 Results from the HINK surveys show that the share of total net wealth belonging to the 1
per cent wealthiest increased from 17.7 per cent in 1983 and 15.7 per cent in 1985 to 20.7 per
cent in 1990 and 19.5 per cent in 1992.
15 The elasticity of the Gini coefficient with respect to the k:th component of wealth is defined
by
         hk = (mk/m)(Ck-G)/G;
where G is the Gini coefficient of total wealth, Ck the concentration index for wealth
component k and mk/m the population share of component k.
16It is assumed that the asset increases in value such that its concentration index is unchanged.
17It is a weakness of this regression analysis that all households with nonpositive wealth in any
of the two years were dropped from the analysis. The mobility analysis in the next section does
not have this deficiency.
18 Shorrock’s measure of mobility (Shorrocks 1978) is defined as37
                                                                                                                                                  
S=(N-tr(P))/(N-1);
where N is the number of groups (deciles) and tr(P) is the trace of the N*N transition matrix P.
The range of S is [0, N/(N-1)], and a higher S indicates a higher degree of mobility.
19 It is also interesting to note that when the analysis was limited to a subsample of stable
households the relevant parameter estimates did not change much.
20If consumer durables are excluded from the wealth definition Shorrock’s mobility measure
drops to 0.85.
21 Only if a head dies the headship goes to the surviving spouse.
22The following socio-economic variables were used:
- The mean of the tax assessed values of owner occupied houses in the municipality where the
household lived
  for at least one of the years 1983, 1985 and 1992.
- The purchase coefficient for that municipality for at least one of the years 1983, 1985 and
1992.
- The number of adults, above 18 years of age for at least one of the years 1983, 1985 and
1992.
- The number of employed adults for at least one of the years 1983, 1985 and 1992.
- The age of the household head in 1985/86
- Years of schooling of the household head in 1985/86